Cornell Law Review
Volume 93
Issue 6 September 2008

Article 18

The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary
System Values
Norman W. Spaulding

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1377 (2008)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol93/iss6/18

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

ESSAY
THE RULE OF LAW IN ACTION: A DEFENSE OF
ADVERSARY SYSTEM VALUES
Norman W Spauldingt
INTRODUCTION

Legal Ethics and Human Dignity' is that rare work that bridges legal
theory and the study of the profession's ethical responsibilities. 2 The
gap between the two subjects is surprising and unfortunate because, as
David Luban so deftly shows, they are mutually enriching and share
the same pressing concerns. By all rights, both fields should be transformed by his work.
As with so many of Luban's earlier projects, the core of the book
is an exploration of the lawyer's role in the adversary system, although
he places greater emphasis here on the lawyer's counseling function
both before and in the absence of litigation. 3 Luban also focuses on
the ways that a lawyer's work affects human dignity. 4 Even readers
who remain unconvinced that human dignity can provide a new measure for the limits of professional obligation will profit from Luban's
provocative inquiry.
This Essay takes up Luban's morally grounded critique of the adversary system values that shape the lawyer's role in American society.
I argue that Luban's claims about human dignity, the legal thought of
Lon Fuller, 5 and professional failure (especially the role of lawyers in
justifying torture for the Bush Administration) 6 can all be re-interpreted by engaging his critique of the adversary system. I hope to
show that the very violations of human dignity and ordinary morality
t
Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I am grateful to Pierre-Alexandre
Meloty-Kapella for valuable research assistance.
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007) [hereinafter LUBAN, LEGAL
I
ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY].
Two notable exceptions are: WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OFJUSTICE (1998),
2

and David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990).
3 See, e.g., LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 4-6.
4 See DAVID LUBAN, Lauryers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy As-

saulting It), in LUBAN,

LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNIT,

supra note 1, at 65 [hereinafter

LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity].
5 See DAVID LUBAN, Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in LUBAN,
LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 99 [hereinafter LUBAN, NaturalLaw].
6 See DAVID LUBAN, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND
HUMAN DIGNITY,

supra note 1, at 162 [hereinafter
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that most concern Luban arise not from lawyers committed to traditional understandings of professional responsibility and the adversary
system, but rather from lawyers who have deviated from those
understandings.
I
OF ROLE MORALITY, ORDINARY MORALITY, AND THE
SELF-CENTERED LAWYER

A.

Luban's Critique of Role Morality

The book opens with a critique of role morality-the idea, much
maligned by legal ethicists, that lawyers should receive some degree of
immunity from the general requirements of conscience on account of
their distinctive social role. 7 Professional obligations can lead a lawyer
into actions that are at least morally controversial, if not downright
condemnable. We hold confidences even when doing so may harm
third parties; we represent clients whose past, present, or future behavior may be socially harmful or reprehensible in the eyes of others;
and we often employ tactics that can prevent decisions on the merits
both in and out of the courtroom. Some of us go farther, counseling,
aiding, or abetting clients' lawlessness. We seem to do these things,
Luban contends, because we adhere too closely to a principle that has,
for at least as long as anyone has kept track, defined the role of lawyering in America. 8 The principle is that clients are entitled to diligent
legal services irrespective of the moral worth of their ends.9
Even a cursory survey of the profession reveals that lawyers en-

dorse this principle with varying degrees of enthusiasm and embody it
with varying degrees of consistency. Moreover, the principle is only
loosely incorporated into the standards of professional conduct propounded by state and national bar associations over the last century.

Many lawyers are in fact quite choosy about the clients they represent; 10 more than a few of us fail to act with anything approaching
7
See LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note ], at 9-11; DAVID LUBAN,
The Adversary System Excuse, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 19
[hereinafter LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse].
8 See LuBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 20; see also CANONS OF PROFES-

SIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908); GEORGE SHARSWOOD,
AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF LAW 26 (1854).

A

COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE

9 See sources cited supra note 8.
10 The dominant selective principle is, of course, a client's ability to pay. On the
restricted universe of access left to those who cannot pay, see generally David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209
(2003) (describing the reasons for the decline in access to legal services for the poor,
including a lack of funding). Conflict doctrines quite often lead lawyers to be overly
choosy in the interests of not upsetting current clients. See Norman W. Spaulding, ReinterpretingProfessionalIdentity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 27-39 (2003) (discussing five scenarios in
which conflicts of interest may arise); see alsoJohn Dzienkowski, PositionalConflicts ofInterest,
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diligence (let alone zeal) for our clients; 1' and the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct now expressly provide that, if a lawyer "fundamental[ly] disagree[s]" with or finds a client's proposed actions "repugnant," she may withdraw from the representation.1 2 Conflict of
interest rules have historically required the same result if any of a lawyer's interests, feelings, or convictions would cloud her judgment or
13
otherwise prevent her from diligently pursuing the client's interests.
Nevertheless, the professional ideal, the "dominant view," as William
14
Simon has called it, is still zealous advocacy.
Luban begins his critique of the dominant view with the proposition that because zealous advocacy is morally controversial-because
it requires actions that often conflict with what he calls "ordinary morality"' 5-it requires special justification.1 6 As he concisely states: "Unless zealous advocacy could be justified by relating it to some larger
social good, the lawyer's role would be morally impossible."1 7 The
"larger social good, we are told, is justice, and the adversary system is
the best way of attaining it."18s Luban suggests that the invocation of
the adversary system and-its virtues as an "institutional excuse" for
morally suspect conduct by lawyers has become so deeply entrenched
in legal culture as to lie beyond argument.1 9 For shady lawyers facing
the charge that they lack moral scruples, and even for upstanding lawyers wary of the profession's tenuous public standing, the link between lawyers' role conduct and the social value of the adversary
system has become "more like a presupposition accepted by all parties
20
before the arguments begin."
71 TEX. L. REV. 457, 463-69 (1993) (discussing different types of positional conflicts of
interest).
I I One need only briefly scan the criminal cases on ineffective assistance of counsel to
get a feel for the vastness of the problem. See, e.g., Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 473-75
(5th Cir. 2004); Anderson v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 382, 392 (5th Cir. 2003); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338-40 (5th Cir. 2001). On the civil side, lack of diligence and communication by lawyers remain among the most consistent and pervasive complaints of clients.
See, e.g., STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 2006 REPORT ON THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA DIscIPLINE SYSTEM 3 (2007), available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/reports/2006_Annual-Discipline-Report.pdf (listing "performance" and "duties to client" as the most
common allegations in complaints raised against California lawyers). See generally ABA
STANDING

COMM. ON

LAwYERS'

PROF'L LIAB.,

PROFILE

OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE

CLAIMS:

2000-2003 (2005) (categorizing and analyzing various types of malpractice claims).
12

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2007).

Rule 1.16(b) lists other

grounds for voluntary withdrawal. See id. R. 1.16(b).
13 See id. R. 1.7.
14

See SIMON, supra note 2, at 7.

15

LUBAN, Adversay System Excuse, supra note 7, at 45; see id. at 58 (referring to "other
morally relevant factors").
16 See id. at 44-47.
17
Id. at 26.
18
19
20

Id.
See id.
Id.
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In pages that reveal why Luban is one of the most influential critics of lawyers' role morality, he then sets about interrogating "the adversary system excuse." Rather than reveal the truth underlying
disputes, the adversary system permits, and even sometimes invites,
obfuscation; 21 rather than protect the substantive rights of participants, it encourages lawyers to press for advantages that exceed the
entitlements of their clients and infringe upon the rights of their adversaries; 22 rather than divide responsibility for adjudication in a selfcorrecting balance of roles played by judge, jury, and opposing advo23
cates, the adversary system allows lawyers to manipulate the scales.
Nonconsequentialist arguments for the adversary system fare no
better with Luban.2 4 To begin with, there is nothing "intrinsically
good" about the lawyer-client relationship. 25 Even if the autonomy
and individuality of some clients stands to be enhanced legitimately by
a lawyer's services, not all clients' needs are morally innocent or neutral. 26 Moreover, in many cases, achieving a client's ends may come at

the expense of the autonomy and individuality of third parties. 2 7 Second, Americans have not, formally or otherwise, "consented" to the
adversary system. 28 We have "over an extended period of time ...
incorporated the institution into our shared practices," but this only
establishes its acceptability, not its moral worth or normative superiority. 2 9 Indeed, as Luban insists, "Few of our institutions are trusted less
than adversary adjudication, precisely because it seems to license law30
yers to trample the truth, and legal rights, and common morality.
Finally, Luban claims that the adversary system does not enjoy the
31
sanction of an historical tradition deeply embedded in our culture.
Its features have changed over time and, in his view, it cannot be listed
32
among our indispensable social institutions.
This leaves only the bare fact that the adversary system "is
there,"13 and the well-informed supposition that replacing it altogether would be an immense task of uncertain cost and uncertain success. Thus, Luban concludes that if all that can be said for the
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

See id. at 32-40.
See id. at 42-43.
See id. at 44-47.
See id. at 47-55.
See id. at 48-51.
See id. at 48-49.
See id.
See id. at 51-52.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53.

31
32
33

See id. at 53-55.
See id. at 53-55.
Id. at 60.
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adversary system is that it "seems to do as good ajob as any," 34 we can
choose to stick with it, but it cannot save lawyers from censure for
deviance from the standards of ordinary morality: "a social institution
that can receive only a pragmatic justification is not capable of providing institutional excuses for immoral acts." 35 At best, the distinctive
professional obligations of lawyers enjoy a presumption of legitimacy,
but that presumption should be readily displaced by evidence that a
36
role act would be morally harmful.
The critique is powerful, alluring in its simplicity, and has set the
foundation for a generation of legal ethics scholarship. Most promisingly, it appears to present a means not only of avoiding some of the
social cost of zealous advocacy, but also of saving lawyers from the
disaffection and alienation of living lives divided by tension between
37
professional and personal morality.

But the critique raises as many questions as it answers. To begin
with, Luban is least precise in discussing how the presumption in favor
of professional obligations and its displacement by the standards of
common morality are to operate in practice. This is exactly where one
would most wish for precision, for something more like an engineer's
design specs than the architect's inspiring sketch. The moral questions involved in lawyering are by definition practical. They are questions of praxis. Clients need to act in the world, and lawyers have to
make decisions in aid (or restraint) of those actions. If the trap door
that frees lawyers from morally controversial professional obligations
is hard to find-if it is everywhere and nowhere-Luban's presumption-displacement theory loses a good bit of its appeal.
Are lawyers to resolve even modest conflicts between role obligations and ordinary morality in favor of ordinary morality? At one
point, Luban seems to say as much, arguing that only "slight moral
wrongs" can be excused by claiming the role requires the acts that
cause them. 38 "The adversary system," he writes, "possesses only slight
moral force, and thus appealing to it can excuse only slight moral
wrongs." 39 This is followed by the even stronger claim that
"[a] nything else that is morally wrong for a nonlawyer to do on behalf
of another person is morally wrong for a lawyer to do as well. The
lawyer's role carries no moral privileges and immunities." 40
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
36
See id. at 63.
37
See generally DAVID LUBAN, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN
DIGNITY, supra note 1,at 267 [hereinafter LUBAN, Integrity] (discussing the difficulties that
lawyers encounter advocating for causes that they find morally disagreeable).
38
Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
34
35

39
40

Id.
Id.
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Or is the presumption in favor of role obligations only displaced
when the role requires serious deviance from the standards of ordinary morality? At another point, Luban contends that:
The adversary system and the system of professional obligation it
mandates are justified only in that, lacking a clearly superior alternative, they should not be replaced. This implies ...a presumption
in favor of professional obligation, but one that any serious and
countervailing moral obligation rebuts.... When serious moral obligation conflicts with professional obligation, the lawyer must be41
come a civil disobedient to professional rules.
How serious? Whose view of seriousness counts? The lawyer's, the
client's, the lawyer's guess about the views of third parties who would
suffer the moral harm, the lawyer's guess about the views of the public
at large?
On the one hand, if even modest deviance from the standards of
ordinary morality is not excused, not much would be left to the principal-agent relationship between client and attorney. The lawyer would
be required to betray the client often enough that clients would have
an incentive, where possible, to exclude lawyers from critical decisions
and to invest in other methods of obtaining knowledge about the law.
Perhaps both would be desirable outcomes. Perhaps the profession
would adapt. But it seems plain that this amounts to something more
than a presumption-displacement approach. It represents the dissolution of the distinctive social role that lawyers play. The pragmatic justification for the adversary system Luban accepts, weak as it is, would
seem to demand more insulation for the role.
On the other hand, if only grave deviance displaces the presumption in favor of a lawyer acting as a zealous advocate, Luban's argument is not really an argument against professional obligation as the
lawyering role is currently defined. Lawyers wary of morally questionable clients are free to turn them away and avoid the risk of getting
embroiled in work of doubtful social value. 42 (Though the fact that
many lawyers do not turn these clients away may suggest more of an
underlying consistency between lawyers' role obligations and the demands of ordinary morality than Luban acknowledges; there may be
quite a bit more consistency than Luban thinks.) 43 Along the same
lines, it is difficult to imagine juries imposing malpractice liability
against lawyers who act against their clients' interests when doing so
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The exception is, of course, if a judge
orders the lawyer to take the case. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.2 (2007).
43 To be sure, many lawyers take dubious cases for the attractive fee involved. But that
only restates the question about the valence of ordinary morality under conditions of value
pluralism. Perhaps ordinary morality is more oriented around wealth-maximizing behavior than Luban believes. I take these issues up in the ensuing sections.
41

42
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prevents genuinely grave moral harm to third parties and society at
large.

B.

44

Information Asymmetry and Value Pluralism

More significantly, Luban does not suggest how lawyers should
act when the moral costs of their role acts are unclear, ambiguous,
contestable, or unknowable. Perhaps he thinks the most common
professional failures are easy cases. But I suspect the easy cases, even
if we hear about them more frequently and take them up more often
both for pedagogic purposes in the classroom and for analytic purposes in print, are not the most common. 45 The daily fare of lawyering, the seemingly banal cases that make lawyering terrifying,
44
In most states, the standard of liability for criminal lawyers requires the clients to
establish their factual innocence. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs § 53 cmt. d (2000). In civil cases, lawyers will often have grounds to argue that their
refusal to serve a client was in the client's best interest, not just the interest of third parties
or the public. For a statement of the exception for reasonable good faith errors in judgment, see Hodges v. Carter, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (N.C. 1954). An example can be drawn
from the following contracts case discussed in Samuel Williston's autobiography:
In a well-known passage from his autobiography, Samuel Williston described an incident from practice involving a financial dispute. As counsel
for the defendant, Williston had carefully reviewed his client's correspondence with the plaintiff. Opposing counsel had made no inquiries concerning certain letters relevant to the controversy, and no one mentioned
them at trial. The court ruled in favor of the defendant and gave an oral
explanation of its reasoning that Williston describes as follows: "In the
course of his remarks the ChiefJustice stated as one reason for his decision
a supposed fact which I knew to be unfounded. I had in front of me a letter
that showed his error. Though I have no doubt of the propriety of my
behavior in keeping silent, I was somewhat uncomfortable at the time....
The lawyer must decide when he takes a case whether it is a suitable one for
him to undertake and after this decision is made, he is not justified in turning against his client by exposing injurious evidence entrusted to him. If
that evidence was unknown to him when he took the case, he may sometimes withdraw from it, but while he is engaged as counsel he is not only
not obligated to disclose unfavorable evidence, but it is a violation of his
duty to his client if he does so.
DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrv: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD
442-43 (2d ed. 1998) (quoting SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW 271-72 (1940)). Williston did not turn the letter over. See id. at 477. But he states his role obligation too categorically (assuming the letter was not privileged). Even if he had decided to turn the letter
over voluntarily before trial, he might still have argued that the decision was in the client's
interests if he reasonably believed that his adversary would properly request it or discover it
by other means. Withholding unfavorable evidence that has not (yet) been properly requested by an adversary is consistent with professional obligations but always risky. The
question of liability, in any event, is not absolute, but rather contingent on what a reasonably knowledgeable, competent, and prudent lawyer would do. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) & cmt. 2 (noting a lawyer's discretion with respect to the technical
means used to meet the client's ends); id. R. 1.3 cmt. I ("A lawyer is not bound, however,
to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may
have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a
matter should be pursued."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52.
45
See infra Part II.C.
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fascinating, and ethically salient work, tends to involve moral costs of
46
uncertain or contested dimensions.

This is so for at least two reasons. First, morally relevant information adequate to displace professional obligations will often elude
even the most upstanding, inquisitive lawyer. There are inevitable information asymmetries between agents and the principals they serve;
between principals who are attempting to collaborate; and certainly
between principals who have become adversaries. Diligent lawyers
work to overcome these asymmetries, at least with respect to legally
relevant facts. Indeed, lawyers are specialists in gathering and assess47
ing facts.
But even the most diligent lawyers know that their advice and advocacy will almost never be based on anything approaching complete
knowledge. They know too that their moral evaluations of a client or
case may be confounded by subsequent revelations. 48 Indeed, there is
often a large difference between what lawyers believe, recall, or assume and events as they have occurred or will subsequently play out.
We are paid to make sound judgments in a universe defined by asymmetric and incomplete information, not one defined by parity and
completeness. And although competence demands that we attend to
the moral valence of the legal actions we take for our clients (an obligation that requires keen sensitivity to the moral consequences our
actions will have for others49 ), we properly forebear when it comes to
actually resolving doubtful moral questions for our clients.
An example of the sort of morally complex universe lawyers frequently confront may be useful. Beginning in 1997, several high-ranking officers at Chiquita Brands International arranged for the
company to make "protection payments" to both left- and right-wing
paramilitary groups in Columbia to prevent harm to banana workers
at its most profitable subsidiary. 50 Over the course of the next seven
46
This is obviously an empirical question, and I confess that I am unprepared to
answer it in empirical terms. What follows should therefore be read as arguing that there
is good reason to believe that the question is open.
47
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. c. I address the problem of lawyers who take the route of
deliberate ignorance and lawyers who take advantage of information asymmetries below.
See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
48
Simon's purposivist account of the law offers a particularly compelling argument
against drawing any deep distinction between moral and legal information. See SIMON,
supra note 2, at 50 ("The moral basis for the lawyer's decisions are the same principles that
underlie and legitimate legal judgments generally."). Even taking this argument at face
value, law is still (perhaps inevitably) underinclusive, so the universe of morally relevant
facts remains broader than the universe of legally relevant information.
49
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCE R. 2.1.
50
The Chiquita-Hills facts are drawn from the following newspaper stories: Chiquita
Settles Case on Payments to Rebel Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, at C13; Neil A. Lewis,
Inquiry Threatens Ex-Leader of Securities Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, at A19; Neil A.
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years, protection payments totaling approximately $1.7 million were
made to one right-wing group, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia. 5 1 In 2001, the United States designated the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia as a terrorist organization. 52 That same
53
year, Chiquita went through a bankruptcy.
As part of the transition out of bankruptcy, the company added
Roderick M. Hills to its board of directors in April 2002. 5 4 Hills is a

corporate attorney who served as White House counsel to President
Gerald Ford, taught at Harvard Law School and the Yale School of
Management, and is reputed to have helped lead government efforts
to "clean up the problem of corporations' paying bribes overseas" dur55
ing his tenure with the SEC in the mid-1970s.
Hills claims that when he first learned about Chiquita's protection payments, they were described by company officials as payments
to security contractors. 5 6 When the truth became clear to him in early
57
2003, he objected, knowing full well that the payments were illegal.
The company's outside counsel also "strongly recommended" that the
payments end immediately. 58 Stopping the payments, however, would
have jeopardized the safety of its subsidiary's employees in Colombia. 59 Hills advised the company to reveal the payments to the Depart-

ment of Justice in the hope, one suspects, of helping the company
avoid punishment and find a solution short of cutting off payments.
Beginning in April 2003, meetings took place between Hills,
other Chiquita officials, and Michael Chertoff, then head of the Department of Justice's criminal division. 60 All the while, Chiquita con61
tinued making protection payments.
The government has since claimed that Chertoff told Chiquita in
the first meeting that the payments were illegal and had to stop immediately. 62 The company, which was investigated, prosecuted, and
Lewis, No Chargesfor Chiquita Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007, at A21; Victims of Colombian Conflict Sue Chiquita Brands, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/11/15/business/worldbusiness/15chiquita.html. As I discuss below, there are many
facts about the story we may never learn.
51
Chiquita Settles Case on Payments to Rebel Groups, supra note 50, at C13.
52
Id.
53
Lewis, Inquiry Threatens Ex-Leader of Securities Agency, supra note 50, at A19.
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
Id.
59
See Victims of Colombian Conflict Sue ChiquitaBrands, supra note 50. Company officials
insisted that the company "had no choice to pay protection money to groups that had
threatened to turn death squads loose on its banana plantations and employees." Id.
60
See Lewis, Inquiry Threatens Ex-Leader of Securities Agency, supra note 50, at A19.
61
See id. The payments continued until the company left Columbia in 2004. See id.
62 See id.
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fined $25 million dollars for making the protection payments, insists
that Mr. Chertoff was "more equivocal," and had indicated that he
"understood the sensitivity of the situation and would get back to the
'63
Chiquita officials.
The matter remained live until last fall because the Department
of Justice kept its investigation open, threatening to prosecute Hills
and other Chiquita officials whom the government believed were responsible for the company's decision to continue making payments
after the first meeting with Chertoff.64 According to defense lawyers
for these company officials,
the company engaged in regular discussions with Justice Department officials about using the payments as an opportunity to provide intelligence to the government about [the right-wing
organization]. Those discussions, the lawyers contend, were crucial
in convincing the company that the U.S. government was prepared
65
to tolerate the continuation of the payments.
Hills' lawyer said his client "led Chiquita's prompt and voluntary disclosure of these payments to the Department ofJustice and had a reasonable basis to believe that Chiquita could maintain the status quo
while the department considered the complicated issues at stake. '6 6
We may never know what Hills and other Chiquita officials knew
about the matter. Although a civil suit seeking $7.86 billion has been
filed in federal court against the company on behalf of victims of the
United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia, 67 the government has decided it will not seek criminal charges against Hills or any of the top
executives at Chiquita (quite probably to protect the government lawyers who attended the meetings, and especially Chertoff, from testifying at any trial).68 Still, one doubts that Hills could have learned all
the morally relevant facts about the protection payments his company
was making. The problem appears not to be that Hills buried his
head in the sand or that he used confidentiality to hide misconduct
from prosecutors. On the contrary, he appears to have diligently inquired into the matter and then advised the company to confess.
The problem is instead that the morally relevant facts are bewilderingly complex. Even a provisional answer would have required extensive scholarly and first-hand investigation. 69 Is it worse to stop the
Id.
See Lewis, No Charges for Chiquita Executives, supra note 50, at A21.
Lewis, Inquiry Threatens Ex-Leader of Securities Agency, supra note 50, at A19.
Id. (quoting Brian M. Heberlig).
See Victims of Colombian Conflict Sue Chiquita Brands, supra note 50.
See Lewis, No Charges for Chiquita Executives, supra note 50, at A21; Lewis, Inquiry
Threatens Ex-Leader of Securities Agency, supra note 50, at A19.
A preliminary query suggests that the company has a long, and, to say the very least,
69
morally controversial history in Columbia and other Latin American countries, particularly
63
64
65
66
67
68

2008]

THE RULE OF LAW IN ACTION

1387

payments and risk grievous harm to the local workers, or is it worse to
continue the payments and risk empowering a dangerous paramilitary
organization and enflaming already desperate and violent conditions
in the country? Does the company's presence have an overall stabilizing or destabilizing effect on the country? Will young people who
might otherwise be forcibly recruited into these paramilitary organizations have some other choice if foreign companies like Chiquita have
a presence in the country?
The law, on the other hand, was quite clear. The payments were
illegal. Or at least the law was clear until the meetings with Chertoff
took place. Assuming that the company's version of the meetings with
the government is accurate, and that Chertoff was at least open to
allowing the payments to continue in the hopes of gaining intelligence on the paramilitary group, the Department ofJustice muddied
the legal waters in its exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Put bluntly,
it was the lawyers charged with the vague injunction to do justice, not
the lawyers charged with serving their client within the bounds of the
law, who seem to have gone astray.
If one assumes instead that the government's account is accurate,
Hills and the Chiquita officials took a terrible risk by continuing to
make payments. Was that choice an act of morally brave civil disobedience (to protect the local workers) or an act of foolishly profit-centered lawlessness (to eek out as much profit from the Colombia
operations before shutting down and pulling out)? Won't the answer
depend not just on who is asked (a point I come to below) but how
much is possible to know about the moral contours of the decision
when the decision had to be made?

regarding the treatment of its workers. See Protection and Money: U.S. Companies, Their Employees, and Violence in Columbia:JointHearingBefore the Subcomms. on Int'l Orgs., Human Rights
and Oversight & the W. Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007)
(collecting congressional testimony about fruit companies' payments to South American
guerilla groups); DAN KOEPPEL, BANANA: THE FATE OF THE FRUIT THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD 84-95, 218-27 (2008) (describing the often violent history of banana-producing
companies' responses to labor disruptions); GEOFF SIMONS, COLUMBIA: A BRUTAL HISTORY
46-47 (2004); Philippe Bourgois, One Hundred Years of United Fruit Company Letters, in BANANA WARS: POWER, PRODUCTION, AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAS, at 103 (Steve Striffler &
Mark Moberg eds. 2003) (collecting internal United Fruit Company documents describing
company practices between 1914 and 1970); Margelo Bucheli, United Fruit Company In
Latin America, in BANANA WARS: POWER, PRODUCTION, AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAS, supra,
at 80 (using United Fruit's financial data to explore the company's responses to political
developments between 1945 and 1970); Cynthia A. Watson, Political Violence in Columbia:
Another Argentina?, 12 THIRD WORLD Q. 25 (1990) (describing history and organization of
Columbian right- and left-wing guerilla and paramilitary groups).
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In any event, most of Luban's examples are of another kind entirely-lawyers who either deliberately avoid guilty knowledge, 70 or
lawyers who act against plain facts showing the dire moral consequences of their actions. 71 In an example of graymail, Luban reports
that Richard Helms "lied to a Senate committee about American in72
volvement in the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile.
Helms was prosecuted for felony perjury but Edward Bennett Williams
forced the government to offer a mere misdemeanor plea by
"argu[ing] that national security information was relevant to Helms'
defense and must be turned over... thereby confronting the government with the unpleasant choice of dropping the action or making
public classified and presumably vital information. ' 73 In a second example of graymail, Luban discusses companies seeking approval of
mergers that were controversial under antitrust law.74 Lawyers for the
companies got the Federal Trade Commission to back away from
blocking the mergers by threatening to close down operations and
dismiss employees. 75 "'Of course, the mere announcement of the
threat to close the plant generates enormous political pressure on the
prosecutor not to go forward.' .. . [T] he firms played a nice game of

chicken: closing down by stages, they laid off a few workers each day
76
until the FTC cried uncle."
In both examples, Luban presents the morally relevant facts as
clear-cut. The framing of the first example encourages the reader to
assume that Helms is guilty; the perjury is presented as an act intended to conceal the U.S. government's role in the rise of military
dictator General Augusto Pinochet, 77 and Williams' threat to seek national security information at trial is presented as a mere tactic with no
relevance to the merits of Helms' defense. 78 The graymail thus appears to save Helms at the expense of public knowledge about antidemocratic foreign policy maneuvers. 79 The framing of the second
example asks the reader to assume not only that the contemplated
mergers were plainly illegal (the FTC's case, we are told, "looked parSee generally DAVID LUBAN, Contrived Ignorance, in LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HuMAN
1, at 209 [hereinafter LUBAN, Contrived Ignorance] (describing situations
where lawyers tried to maintain deliberate ignorance).
71
See LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 24 ("[T]he zealous advocate is
supposed to press the client's interests to the limit of the legal, regardless of the 'torments
or destruction' this wreaks on others.").
72
Id. at 21.
73 Id.
74 See id. at 22.
70

DIGNITY, supranote

75
76
77

78
79

See id.
Id.
See id. at 21.
See id.
See id.
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ticularly good and none of the usual defenses appeared to work" 80 ),
but also that they were against the public interest and that they would
not have resulted in job losses and plant closures once complete. All
of these things may be true, but the factual contours of hard cases are
rarely so clear-cut. When information problems are simplified in this
way, the presumption-displacement approach looks rather promising.8 1 But when serious information problems are present, its appeal
is harder to see.
The second reason to think that conflicts between professional
obligations and the standards of ordinary morality are typically difficult to resolve is the extent of value pluralism in American society.
The United States is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the
world, and Americans have frequently virulent differences of opinion
on the content of ordinary morality. As a result, American law has
always been as much a site of contestation as a vehicle for the vindication and enforcement of seemingly well-settled public values. Even in
run of the mill, non-constitutional cases, the moral valence of available legal positions is almost always plural. The propriety of using covenants not to compete or boilerplate forum-selection clauses is as open
to debate as the propriety of putting the Ten Commandments in a
public square. 82 And as long as Americans take their pluralism as a
fact to celebrate rather than a problem to be overcome, concepts like
"ordinary morality" offer only mirage-like comfort. 83
80 Id. at 22.
81 For other examples framed by Luban in this way, see id. at 23-24 (discussing the
Lake Pleasant case in which lawyers for a criminal defendant "were told by their client...
of two murders he committed, found and photographed the bodies but kept the information to themselves for half a year-this despite the fact that the father of one of the victims,
knowing that [one of the lawyers] was representing an accused murderer, personally
pleaded with him to tell him if he knew anything about his daughter"); id. at 25 (discussing
discovery and conflict of interest rules as if they are used only or primarily "to delay trial or
impose added expense on the other side"); id. at 25-26 (discussing a statute of limitations
example that assumes the defense defeats a 'Just debt"); id. at 34 (discussing trial tactics for
cross-examination and interrupting the closing argument of opposing counsel under the
assumption that the witness is truthful and that such tactics have the purpose and effect of
preventing the truth from coming out rather than correcting distortion of the truth).
82 I offer the private law examples because, in each, the lawyer will have a pre-litigation counseling role and an adversarial role once the client is sued. See, e.g., Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (enforcement of a forum selection
clause); Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73, 84-85 & n.14
(1998) (enforcing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1995) to strike down a covenant
not to compete, while discussing contrary rules in other states).
83 See LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 44-45. Luban concedes in his
response that morality may not be completely shared, that it "is complicated," and that
when we try to specify norms, behavior quickly outstrips them, so that "every new level of
norms calls for another to respond to imperfect compliance." David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics,93 CORNELL L. REv. 1437, 1442, 1443 (2008) [hereinafter Luban, Response]. He nevertheless tries to rescue the concept of common morality
by suggesting that the problem of pluralism-or, as he frames it, moral indeterminacy-
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evaporates once the lawyer exercises her judgment to make a decision about the moral
propriety of her conduct. See id. at 1445 ("At the point you decide.., the indeterminacy of
ordinary morality is no longer an issue, and to insist that ordinary morality offers only
'mirage-like comfort' errs in two ways: first, because your moral code is no mirage, and
second, because in this case it is almost surely no comfort."). The argument assumes the
very question at issue: whether, in the face of moral indeterminacy, the lawyer should defer
to the client's moral judgment when the client's position is lawful and the lawyer has conveyed her views. The exercise of individual moral judgment is possible (and of course
desirable), but in order to trump the client's judgment, in matters to do with the client, lawyers should be confident that their individual judgments derive from genuinely common
values rather than merely parochial values, self-interest, self-delusion, or mere fallibility.
Luban concedes that clients may suffer from "cognitive distortions," id. at 1449, regarding
moral consequences, but he seems too reluctant to acknowledge that lawyers are at least as
prone to such lapses as their clients or that in a principal-agent relationship, the client's
(lawful) choice should prevail.
In a pluralistic society, we should also be suspicious of arguments for "common morality" that have a clearly identifiable political tilt. Luban's are decidedly left liberal. To give
but one example, in his register wealth-maximizing behavior is the plainly amoral threat
against which common moral principles are identified and affirmed. Lawyers should be
more restrained in civil litigation, which is primarily to do with moneyjudgments, than in
criminal litigation, which is to do with a defendant's liberty, see Luban, Adversary System
Excuse, supra note 7, at 30-31, 60; individuals, but not corporations, are entitled to the
attorney-client privilege, see Luban, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 4, at 87 ("Because, in my view, the rationale for lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege is
to protect the human dignity of the client, it should apply only when the client is a fleshand-blood person."); and, most revealingly, wealth maximization does not, in his view,
qualify as a moral principle, see, e.g., Luban, Response, supra, at 1449 (arguing that where
greed is the motive, such as in the Dalkon Shield case, "the disagreement between the
scrupulous lawyer and the less scrupulous client is not a consequence of moral pluralism").
For others, wealth maximization is a predominant moral principle in so far as it offers a
proxy for utility. To insist, as I do, that common morality can offer only mirage-like comfort is not to deny the possibility of moral judgment but to warn that under conditions of
pluralism the concept of common morality itself plays an ideological role. We cannot solve
our worries about the ideology of advocacy with an ideology of common morality.
Luban also seems overly confident that, even if we disagree about the good, "when it
comes to the great evils, people are nearly unanimous." Luban, Response, supra, at 1447. If
torture is one of the great evils regarding which people are nearly unanimous, Luban has
some work to do to account for Congress's recent endorsement of harsh interrogation
methods, let alone popular acquiescence to the current administration's practices. See infra Conclusion (discussing the torture memos and the Military Commissions Act of 2006).
Do those who support harsh interrogation measures suffer from "cognitive distortion"? I
think the better explanation is that torture is an overdetermined term precisely because it
signifies an evil the contours of which provoke fundamental disagreements. We can all say
we are against "torture" without adding much at all to the question of what to do in specific
cases. If the debate about the legitimacy of waterboarding proves anything, its that we can
all condemn torture without reaching anything near consensus on whether waterboarding
is torture, or if it is, whether it is nevertheless justifiably used in certain contexts. Litigation
in the adversary system takes up fundamental disagreements notjust about the good life,
but the condemnable.
As for Luban's worry in his response that I elsewhere accuse moral activists like him
"of adopting an outlandishly Emersonian view of the self," Luban, Response, supra, at 1440, 1
can only urge readers to review the essay he cites and draw their own conclusions about
what animates moral activist critics of the legal profession and the broader American tradition of anti-institutional moral reform. See Norman W. Spaulding, ProfessionalIndependence
in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1931, 1941-43 (2008).
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There is, to put the point more plainly, a rather intimate (if not
essential) relationship between our pluralism, our latent libertarianism,8 4 and the morally humble role that lawyers play in the adversary
system.8 5 The adversary system and the role obligations it imposes on
lawyers establish a highly decentralized process of self-governance.
The law is not self-executing, but neither is it dependent upon having
the resources to win the indulgence of preoccupied legislators, securing the consensus and cooperative intervention of a class of elites, or
86
state intervention.
Instead, citizens and their lawyers decide whether and to what
extent their rights will be protected, extended, or modified. They decide how much energy to spend searching for the smoking gun that
will prove their case, how to proceed without it, or, if they are defendants, whether to turn it over. They also decide whether to settle or
press for public resolution.8 7 Though he and Lon Fuller expect more
from law's "internal morality" than I do, Luban's pair of chapters expanding on Fuller's legal thought powerfully substantiates this decentralized account of law. The lawyer and her citizen-client, not
appellate judges and legislators, are the true protagonists, the most
88
immediate lawmakers.
At almost every stage (before, during, and after litigation), outcomes may turn not so much on what actually happened as on how
much energy (and resources) litigants are willing to spend to press
their claims. Neither truth nor the protection of substantive rights
could possibly be the primary goal of a system so designed. Both are
in fact quite often sacrificed on the altar of party control89 Rather,
84
By this I mean our atypically strong skepticism of state authority and aversion to
state subsidized bureaucratic institutions, as compared with other modern democracies.
85
I say humble rather than neutral or amoral because professional standards do not
require, or even endorse, moral indifference. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1
(2007). On the relationship between the adversary system and a weak state, see ROBERT A.
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 6-16 (2001). 1 address the
relationship between value pluralism and legal ethics at greater length in Spaulding, supra
note 10.
86 These assertions are more true of civil than of criminal litigation. The emphasis on
civil litigation is intentional, since Luban seems most skeptical of zealous advocacy in the
civil sphere. See LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 28-32.
87 This, in any event, is the ideal represented by the dominant view of the lawyer's
role. There are of course instances when the lawyer must remonstrate with the client or
withdraw. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.16(a). Additionally, there are instances in which the lawyer may forebear from using certain tactics. See id. R. 1.2. And, to
be sure, access to counsel is rarely free.
88
LUBAN, Natural Law, supra note 5, at 99; DAVID LUBAN, A Different Nightmare and a
Di[ferent Dream, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 131 [hereinafter
LUBAN, Nightmare and Dream].
89
See Amalia D. Kessler, Our InquisitorialTradition:Equity Procedure,Due Process, and the
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial,90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1215 (2005) ("Our current adversarial approach ... can be much more easilyjustified as vindicating an interest in
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decentralization emphasizes the agency, and hence the accountability,
of the citizen-client in the production of law, as well as the indeterminacy and instability of the law's intersection with public values. 90 It
does so not only by permitting the definition and enforcement of
rights to turn in the first instance on party effort, but also by providing
for decision by the verdict ofjuries, a radically decentralized adjudicative technique.
The point is not (merely) that we respect the autonomy, or, more
grandly, as Luban suggests in another provocative chapter, the human
dignity of the citizen, 9 1 but that we disagree about the constitutive features of human dignity. And because we disagree, we need fora in
which to determine (situationally and provisionally) which values are
sufficiently constitutive to enjoy the force of law. To substitute the
conscience of lawyers for their clients' would be a significant and, I
believe, unwelcome step away from democratic decentralization in the
direction of control by a group of elites. Professional obligation
would be replaced, not by any ordinary morality, but by the morality
of lawyers. I find that prospect chilling, just as chilling as I find the
exercise of unfettered discretion and moral activism by prosecutors,
the one group of lawyers that professional standards enjoin to do 'jus92
tice" rather than just diligently pursue the interests of private clients.
Luban acknowledges the problem of legal indeterminacy and gestures at its relationship to value pluralism. 93 But he claims that while
pluralism can explain (if notjustify) zealous advocacy in the presentation of purely legal arguments, it provides no help when it comes to
the adversarial presentation of facts. 94 "It makes sense," he argues, "to
assign each advocate the task of arguing one side's interpretation of
having the litigants control the litigation than it can on truth-seeking grounds."); id. at
1223 ("English justice as a whole was marked from the outset by a characteristically English
decision not to develop a large, state-controlled and state-funded bureaucracy-a decision
that may turn, at a deep historical and cultural level, on the same ideology of self-governance that underlay the development of the rhetoric of the common law as bastion of ancient liberty.").
90
See Kessler, supra note 89, at 1213-14 (discussing the significance of party control in
the Anglo-American concept of due process).
91
See LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 4.
92 On the abuse of prosecutorial discretion, see Developments in the Law: Race and the
CriminalProcess, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1472, 1520 (1988) ("Statistical studies indicate that prosecutors are more likely to pursue full prosecution, file more severe charges, and seek more
stringent penalties in cases involving minority defendants than in cases involving nonminority defendants."). On the prosecutor's "justice"-oriented role obligations, see MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8, cmt. 1 ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister
ofjustice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided
upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and
to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.").
93 See LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 34-35.
94

See id.
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the law as forcefully as possible, and doing everything possible to undermine the adversary's arguments. With no facts to hide and everything out in the open, only the arguments and counter-arguments
remain. '95 Judges can thus see all the possible contours of the deci96
sions they face.

Revealingly, Luban concedes in a footnote that adversarial advocacy of the purely legal, appellate style, may actually be "the form that
justice takes in our world of plural, conflicting values. '9 7 And even
with respect to the representation of facts, he later argues that lawyers
uphold human dignity "by giving the client voice and sparing the client the humiliation of being silenced and ignored."98 Doing this requires constructing a sympathetic and compelling narrative for the
client from available facts. But none of this, for Luban, licenses a lawyer to construct a narrative that is false, deliberately deceptive, or misleading; to employ techniques that forestall the revelation of material
facts; or to prevent negotiation or adjudication on the merits. 99
I earlier emphasized that lawyers are experts at gathering and analyzing facts.1 00 Luban's concern is their ability to "hid[e]" facts, ex10 1
ploit information asymmetries, and "avoid[ ] open argument.
What Luban has in mind is not simple perjury or obstruction of justice, but the more subtle adversarial tactics that lawyers can use to
distort facts and deter or abort litigation. Some of these tactics are
plainly illegal. 10 2 Others are of doubtful utility-they may turn a decision maker in favor of the client, but they may also backfire miserably. 10 3 In either case, a lawyer is unlikely to be held liable for refusing
to use them. 10 4 That leaves the narrower universe of techniques that
are legally permissible, morally controversial, and of near certain
utility.
A lot of energy could be spent, probably with neither side being
convinced of the contrary, debating whether it should be the lawyer's
job to refuse to employ these techniques or the job of those who find
them morally suspect to change the law. The point I want to empha95

Id. at 34.

96

See id. at 34-35.
See id. at 35 n.44 (citing

97

STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT

HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE (1990)).
LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note
98

(2001);

STUART

4, at 72.
99 See LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 34-36 (discussing the drawbacks
of the adversary system).
See supra text accompanying note 47.
100
101
LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 7, at 35 n.44.
102 And they are punishable under Rule 11 and the contempt power of the courts. See
18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000); FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
103 See, e.g., DAVID BERG, THE TRIAL LAWYER: WHAT IT TAKES TO WIN 9 (2003) (discussing the risks of abusive discovery tactics).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2007) (defining professional
104
misconduct).
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size here is the framework of Luban's discussion of factual distortion,
which, for anyone who is not an objectivist, will seem somewhat insensitive to the problems inherent in the social representation of facts.
The cultural and legal root of adversary advocacy is the jury trial,
not equity proceedings before a judge. 10 5 And as any trial lawyer is
quick to confirm, passion and perception have as much to do with jury
verdicts as reason. One can catalogue the errors and injustices this
produces; an exercise that would present rich utilitarian questions
about the social utility of jury trials. But the right to a jury trial is
embedded in the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution
and every state constitution. 10 6 The right is constitutionalized because
the Framers distrusted judges-they distrusted decision makers beholden to a sovereign, even their new, democratically accountable sovereigns. 10 7 They chose instead to give adjudicative authority to a
10 8
decentralized, and always potentially radical, democratic body.
Many of the techniques for managing the reproduction and social representation of facts at trial (and, derivatively, before trial) are
concessions to the role of passion and perception in the fact-finding
function ofjuries. We don't put the witness behind a screen, we don't
have paper trials, we protect the secrecy and autonomy ofjury deliberations, and we use burdens of proof rather than absolute standards
because we recognize that evidence will almost never be conclusive
(indeed, that it will almost always be open to competing interpretations). Judges instruct juries, and a Byzantine set of evidentiary rules
determine what counts as proof, 10 9 but we do not do any number of
things that might anesthetize fact finding from the influence of passion and perception.
There is a long, tired jurisprudential story about how reason, in
the form of dispassionate fact assessment and legal principle as enunciated by appellate judges, operates to check the sway of passion and
perception. I am not unsympathetic to that story, the desire for rational decision on the merits that animates it, or some of the judgecentric rules that support it. But the more persuasive account is synthetic, refusing the Manichean dichotomy on which the "law as reason" story relies, recognizing the constitutional thumb on the scale in
favor ofjuries, and conceding that passion and perception are at least
partly instrumental features of the adversary system. Purely rational
decision of the kind that Dworkin's Hercules, 110 Posner's homo
105
106
107

See infra Part III.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397-98 (1943) (Black, J.,dissenting).

108
109
110

See id. (explaining the reasons behind the adoption of the Seventh Amendment).
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 (defining the rule on "hearsay").
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 239-40 (1986) (describing an ideal judge who

always rules correctly); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-30 (1977) (same).
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economicus, 1 and Langdell's formalist promise' 12 would be undesirable because they are inhuman and always potentially tyrannical. A
democratic legal process in a pluralistic society (a process committed
to the meaningful participation of citizens in the production of law)
profits by inviting, indeed forcing, the citizen-juror and citizen-client
to confront the play of passion, prejudice, and reason. 1 3 The play
really is the thing.
For over two decades I have known an experienced, wellrespected trial lawyer who has spent much of his career representing
defendants in personal injury and product liability litigation. He
teaches at a national trial school, is a leader of his local bar association, and lawyers on both sides of the aisle praise his professionalism
and integrity. In talking about his work, he is perfectly frank about
the fact that when he represents a deep pocket, one of the first things
he does on the morning of trial is replace his fancy wristwatch with a
Timex and pull a Men's Warehouse suit out of the closet. Jury pools
in his county, as in many counties, run from low income to lower middle class, and he doesn't want their first (or for that matter, their continuing) impression of him to be that he makes a lot of money. If the
jury thinks he makes a lot of money, he worries that they'll readily
conclude his clients are even richer, and therefore perfectly capable
of cutting a check for the suffering of the plaintiff sitting at the next
table over.
I have seen him at trial. He has a way of slowly reaching up to
slide his large, thick-rimmed glasses slightly down his nose and staring
over the tops of the rims that makes a person feel like a dastardly liar
or fool. Witnesses quail. Even when they don't, the look is his signal
to the jury that something is amiss with the witness's answer, the one
just given or the one about to come. There are more moves like this
than one could list because the list is as broad as the spectrum of
communicative acts.
Law and evidentiary facts be damned. Neither the attire nor the
look is a particularly nefarious tactic, but how should one assess their
propriety? Is the attire a subtle attempt to manipulate the jury's view
of the facts? Is it merely an attempt to correct for the assumed bias of
the jury? Or is it a concession to the authority, and, as it may happen,
class consciousness of the jury? Though the latter view is personally
more compelling, the more important point is that, no matter what
11
Posner describes "homo economicus," or "economic man," as "a person whose behavior is completely determined by incentives; his rationality is no different from that of a
pigeon or a rat." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 382 (1990).
112
SeeThomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983) (describing
Langdell's attempts to shape the study of law into a scientific inquiry).
113
This is where Fuller's account of the internal morality of law, see supra notes 87-88
and accompanying text, is incomplete.
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trial lawyers wear in front of the jury, they are making a choice about
social representation that jurors may take (or at least our current trial
procedures do not prevent them from taking) into account. As long
as we don't require identical uniforms for all the players, there is no
neutral choice about what to wear in front of the jury. The same goes
for my friend's look over his glasses. As long as a witness is responding
to live questions, the behavior of the questioner is in play.
There is probably a spectrum of client attire, running from things
like Paul Robert Cohen's infamous jacket emblazoned with "fuck the
draft" to monotone business attire." 4 The spectrum is broad indeed-we worry, at a constitutional level, about whether criminal de115
fendants can be forced to appear before juries in jail jumpsuits.
Even if the spectrum for counsel is significantly narrower, the permutations along the way from arguably neutral to plainly distorting are
maddeningly subtle. There is no way to avoid playing to the jury-it
happens as soon as the lawyer steps in front of the jury box. It even
happens when the lawyer makes every effort to play it straight. Other
examples could be enumerated, but the point is clear: the decision a
jury makes is inextricably cultural-grounded in passion, perception,
116
and factual uncertainty.
114 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). Cohen, it should be noted, was
arrested in the corridor outside the municipal court, not in a courtroom during ajury trial.
See id.
115
See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976) ("[T]he State cannot, consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while
dressed in identifiable prison clothes . . ").
116
There are a variety of other techniques lawyers may use to influence a trial's ultimate outcome that have nothing to do with the merits of their clients' position. These
include abortive pre-trial tactics like motions to dismiss on technical grounds (e.g., pleading defects, jurisdictional defects, defects in service, etc.), most of which have to be filed
before discovery. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (requiring that the defense make certain motions before pleading). Indeed, some of these defenses are waived if they are not invoked
up front. See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(g)(2), (h)(1). But that means they will often have to be
invoked well before counsel knows much about the factual and legal, let alone moral,
merits of a case. Rule 4, just to take one example, requires service of process according to
a specific set of methods. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4. The courts have held that parties must
strictly comply with those methods, even dismissing suits in which the parties did not dispute that alternative methods used by a plaintiff gave the defendant actual notice. See, e.g.,
Mid-Continent Wood Prods. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[A] liberal
construction of the rules of service of process 'cannot be utilized as a substitute for the
plain legal requirement as to the manner in which service of process may be had.' . ..
[A]ctual knowledge of the existence of a lawsuit is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant in the absence of valid service of process.") (quoting United States v.
Mollenhauer Labs., Inc., 267 F.2d 260, 262 (7th Cir. 1959)). Proper service of process is a
step along the way to ensuring that the parties have a meaningful hearing on the merits by
ensuring that each side is aware of the pendency of their rights before the court, but it
quite regularly operates to defeat decision on the merits. Luban acknowledges that "law is
inherently double-edged," LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 25, but this does
not affect the rather wooden way in which he frames proper and improper use of technical, procedural rules.
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A similar dynamic is present, at varying degrees of intensity, with
respect to every document a lawyer produces believing that it may become public." 7 Hence all the hours we spend pouring over our own
language, even after we have settled the legal issues in our minds.
C.

Self-Centered Lawyers and the Root of Professional Failure

I also fail to see why the moral accountability of the citizen-client is
not sufficient for those concerned with the moral consequences of
lawyers' vicarious action for the clients they represent. The lawyer
sells legal cover, no more, no less. The line between moral and legal
cover is perhaps not obvious in all cases, but it would surely become
more blurry, not less, with the displacement of existing professional
117 Again privileging the "law as reason" narrative, Luban mistakes the story I relate
about the trial lawyer above for a claim that we should consider "every bias a form of
reason." Luban, Response, supra note 83, at 123-24. He objects that
[t]he fact that a lawyer can get ajury to like him-to take a rather innocent
example of playing on jurors' biases-is not, under any conceivable
description, a method of demonstrating reasonable doubt. Ifjurors acquit
the rapist because his lawyer is lovable, the outcome has nothing to do with
either justice or the defendant's human dignity. It would be impossible to
regulate such behavior, but that doesn't make it ethical.
Id. at 1459-60. A lawyer takes an unnecessary and possibly unprofessional risk in assuming
jurors will find reasonable doubt even if they dislike or distrust the lawyer, but I raise the
difficulty of designing a "neutral" system for the representation and adjudication of social
facts for two other reasons.
First, the goals of our system are not simplyjustice and human dignity, but democratic
accountability and participation. Indeed, the choice among these goals is weighted rather
heavily (by the federal and state constitutions) in favor of the factor Luban ignores-democracy-so much so that we should reject an account of justice that does not include
democratic accountability and participation as essential components. See infra Part II.
Trial by jury invariably privileges the participatory rights ofjurors, litigants, and their counsel. Jurors (and therefore the law) will be influenced by their views of counsel, even when
counsel works scrupulously not to pander. To recognize the democratic attributes of the
adversary system is not to advocate license to pander, much less to say that rational decision and dignity are irrelevant; it is simply to acknowledge our longstanding institutional
commitments and the respects in which they complicate the claim that strictly rational
argument is the only desirable and ethical path to decision "on the merits." Put most
strongly, justice is democracy, not just reason, and the merits are not strictly separable
from the complexities associated with the representation of facts. Of course, the line between appropriate sensitivity to the jury and pandering to bias is not obvious. But it is
precisely for this reason that the adversary system permits decentralized decisions to be
made (for the most part between lawyer and client) about how to present a case to a jury,
subject to judicially enforced limitations.
Second, the salient question is not whether bias is inevitable, but whether the kinds of
bias and distortion that arise in trial by jury are worse than the kinds of bias and distortion
that arise in any alternative institutional forms of adjudication. I am open to institutional
reforms that would be equally democratic, equally consistent with our pluralism, but for
reasons I have suggested above, our current system and the role obligations it places on
lawyers should enjoy more of a presumption of legitimacy than Luban allows. Finally, I am
at pains to note that Luban again springloads both the ethical and epistemic issue in his
response by asking his readers to assume the defendant is "the rapist," see Luban, Response,
supra note 83, at 1459, meaning a person unquestionably guilty of a heinous crime, not
someone potentially innocent, or culpable of only a lesser charge.
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norms. Even so, Luban worries that the accountability of clients is too
often lost in the "responsibility games"' 18 they play with their lawyers.' 19 The client who would otherwise have moral reservations may
release those inhibitions when the lawyer explains the legal cover.
The lawyer, in turn, may feel free to offer questionable legal cover
either because the lawyer has no moral scruples, or, following the dictates of professional obligation, the lawyer simply assumes that any
moral concerns are for the client to sort out. More troublingly, a client's ends may gradually become shaped by the lawyer's cynical
120
acid.
It is certainly conceivable that this happens, and in those instances (when the agent essentially arrogates the authority of the principal) the lawyer should be held to account. However, this does not
fully explain the categories of professional misconduct that Luban focuses on. It would be reductive and unreasonable to conclude that
Ken Lay and Andrew Fastow, the Big Tobacco executives, or the Bush
Administration officials who ordered the torture of detainees, are any
less morally accountable because lawyers offered opinions of doubtful
legal merit purporting to sanction the conduct.' 2 ' It seems equally
reductive and unreasonable to believe it was the subtle influence of
these opinions that formed the conceptual copestone in the minds of
these clients regarding the propriety of these acts.
The more persuasive argument, and the one that Luban would
probably insist upon, is that better lawyers might have prevented or at
least objected to the conduct. 122 And so they might have. But is it
really zealous advocacy, an overly client-centered role orientation, that
explains the failure of the lawyers' seeming indifference to moral
(and, as it happens, legal) consequences that were both dire and obvious? Or is it that the lawyers who went astray in these contexts substituted their own interests and ambitions for the clients'? Was the
problem responsibility games or interest games? At least with the fi-

Nightmare and Dream, supra note 88, at 155.
See id. at 157-58 (describing the advisory role of lawyers and attendant moral implications); LUBAN, Torture Lawyers, supra note 6, at 200-01 (discussing attorneys' reassurances
that their clients' desired conduct is legal).
120 LUBAN, Nightmare and Dream, supra note 88, at 159 (citing William H. Simon, Lawyer
Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs.Jones's Case, 50 MD.L. REv. 213 (1991); William H. Simon,
The Dark Secret of ProgressiveLawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-ReaganEra, 48 U. MiAmi L. REv. 1099 (1994)).
121
See LUBAN, Torture Lawyers, supra note 6, at 201; LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity,
supra note 4, at 87.
122
See LUBAN, Torture Lawyers, supra note 6, at 203, 205 (discussing the obligation of
impartiality in the counseling role and criticizing torture lawyers for facilitating "a legal
train wreck"); cf LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 4, at 87 (advocating for the
abolition of the attorney-client privilege in the context of organizational clients).
118

119

LUBAN,
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nancial accounting scandals, we confront a category of fairly easy cases
in which self-interest is the better explanation.
It is challenging, too challenging I think, to describe the lawyers
for Anderson Consulting and Enron as having genuinely served their
clients' interests when their advice, for which they were lavishly compensated, led to the destruction of their clients. 123 It is equally difficult to see how morally controversial conduct can be chalked up to
genuine client service when the client is not even consulted about
whether the lawyer should engage in the conduct. Put differently, I
simply distrust the motives of lawyers who blindly assume the client
wants a dreadful thing done, reflexively do it in the client's name, and
then afterward either claim to have been personally torn about itcrying all the way to the bank-or too proudly lay it all on their
scrupulous adherence to professional duty.
Self-centered lawyering may masquerade as genuine client-centered lawyering (particularly for lawyers who have gone astray and
would say anything to avoid admitting that they were acting for selfserving reasons), but the two are altogether different. Here Luban's
parting salvo that "one less ideology is ... one less excuse,"1 24 seems
particularly apt. Society should reject post hoc rationalizations for
misconduct arising from self-centered lawyering and should be wary
of ex ante rationalizations from repeat offenders. But if self-centered
lawyering is the root of this sort of professional failure, the source of
what Luban quite properly describes as adversarial "overkill," 125 the
solution is to reinforce the norms of genuine client-centered lawyering, not to water down or dissolve the role.
II
THE ROOTS OF ADVERsARY ADVOCACY

As the earlier discussion of the jury trial suggests, I believe Luban
is too quick to dismiss the historical and cultural pedigree of the adversary system. 126 He puts the case against that pedigree in the following terms:
[T]here is no constant tradition: common law constantly modifies
the adversary system. Indeed, the adversary advocate is a recent in123

See infra text accompanying notes 187-94 (discussing the torture lawyers); see also

LUAN, Torture Lauryers, supra note 6, at 201; cf. LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra

note 4, at 87-88 (arguing that it took too long for the misconduct to surface in the tobacco
cases). See generally Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN.
J.L. Bus. & FIN. 9 (2002), reprinted in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS,
at 625 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (describing the conduct of lawyers involved in the demise of Enron).
124
LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 64.
125
Id. at 43.
126
See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
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vention within that changing tradition. In England, criminal defense lawyers were not permitted to address the courts until 1836; in
the United States, criminal defendants were not guaranteed counsel
until 1963. Civil litigants still have no guarantee of counsel, even in
quasi-criminal matters such as a state's attempt to take a child from
its parent. Moreover, it is simply false that the "neutral partisanship" norm governs every aspect of litigation. Ethics codes and case
law insist that public prosecutors should seek justice, not victory....
All in all, it's hard to see the adversary system as "a clause in the
127
great primaeval contract."
This understates the case in several respects. To begin with, Luban
emphasizes the history of suits at equity in his argument that the common law has "constantly modifie [d]" the adversary system. 128 Flexible
equity procedures certainly influenced the work of the Advisory Committee in its initial design of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
adopted in 1938.129 They exercised influence at the state level even
earlier in reform measures dating as far back as the Field Code of the
mid-nineteenth century. 130 But equity originated as a mere supplement to litigation at common law and therefore makes a poor yardstick for measuring the historical development of adversary
advocacy. 31 Indeed, equity was originally the grace of the king, dispensed by his officers-a system far afield in both institutional design
and practice from common-law adjudication. 3 2 Even when equity
formalized into adjudication, it was dispensed by courts of separate
jurisdiction until the merger of law and equity well into the nineteenth century in most states 13 3 and in 1938 in federal court practice.' 3 4 Given its development from the exercise of sovereign
discretion, it is not surprising that equity reflected inquisitorial features in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American and English

127

LUBAN,

Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 54-55 (quoting EDMUND BURKE,
110 (Anchor Books 1973) (1791)).

REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE

128

See id.

129

See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015,

1149 (1982) (discussing incorporation of equity rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

dure); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 922-26 (1987).
130 See Subrin, supra note 129, at 925.
131
132

See id. at 932.
See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 1-11

(A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1913); JOSEPH STORY, I COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 38-58, at 42-64 (W.H. Lyon, Jr. ed., Little, Brown, and Co. 14th ed.
1918) (1835).
133 See Subrin, supra note 129, at 931-39.
134

See FED. R. Clv. P. 1.
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practice.1 35 That fact takes nothing away from the adversarial features
136
of adjudication at common law.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that equity practice itself is or was
dominated by non-adversarial features. Kessler's fine article, a source
to which Luban refers,1 3 7 recovers an important and too long forgotten strand of inquisitorial influence within equity practice.1 38 However, that influence developed against a larger adversarial
framework.' 39 Charles Dickens' satire of litigation waste and adversarial excess in Bleak House, the infamous case of Jarndyce and
Jarndyce, was in the chancery courts, not the common-law courts.
"Suffer any wrong that can be done you rather than come here,"
would perhaps have applied with equal force to the common-law
140
courts, but it is no compliment to either system.
Even after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted,
discovery practice (the most significant equity feature included by the
Advisory Committee in the new rules14 1 ) was heavily influenced by adversary system values. Any hope of truly non-adversarial, open-handed
discovery was dashed by the Supreme Court quite early on in Hickman
v. Taylor.1 42 The case reads like an ode to zealous advocacy, treating
the adversary system as precisely the sort of institution that has become "a clause in the great primaeval contract. 1 43 The case formally
recognized work-product protection to insulate a lawyer's fact gather144
ing, legal research, and analysis from disclosure to an adversary.
The bench and bar had been anxious and uncertain about how
broad a shift the discovery rules demanded. Some assumed that the
requirement to turn over evidence before trial meant the end of adversary advocacy. As one of the amicus briefs in the case asserted in its
opening pages, "The federal rules of civil procedure pertaining to dis135
136

See Amalia D. Kessler, supra note 89 1206-09.
For a comprehensive account of common law origins, see THEODORE F. T.

PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 671-707 (5th ed. 1956).

137 See LUBAN, Upholders of Human Dignity, supra note 4, at 41 n.60 (citing Kessler, supra
note 89).
138
See Kessler, supra note 89, at 1206-09.
139 Kessler concedes as much. See id. at 1198 n.79, 1225.
140

See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1853).

For early

American complaints about the cost, delay, and confusion of adversary advocacy, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 147 (1985) (referring to Bleak House); id.
at

144-52;

WILLIAM

LEGAL CHANGE IN

E.

NELSON, AMERICANIZATION

MASSACHUSETTS

SOCIETY,

OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF

1760-1830, at 69-78 (1975).

141 On the history of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
influence of equity, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26-45 advisory committee's notes and see generally
Burbank, supra note 129; Subrin, supra note 129.
142 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (recognizing work product protection for a lawyer's notes of
witness interviews taken shortly after a tugboat accident).
143
LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 54 (quoting BURKE, supra note 127,
at 110).

144

See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-14.
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covery admittedly were written with a view toward eliminating the adversary system." 145 Others contended, and the Supreme Court
agreed, that nothing about the rules' endorsement of "[m]utual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties" 146 undermined "the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act
within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests." 147 If work product materials had to be handed over, the Court admonished, the adversary
system would collapse:
[M]uch of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.
Inefficiency, unfairness, and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases
for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing.
And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be
148
poorly served.
Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion was more pointed.
Against Hickman's assertion that "the Rules were to do away with the
old situation where a law suit developed into 'a battle of wits between
counsel,"' Jackson retorted that "a common law trial is and always
should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended to
enable a learned profession to perform its function either without wits
or on wits borrowed from the adversary. '149 Any other rule, he insisted "would... put trials on a level even lower than a 'battle of wits"'
since lawyers would quickly be converted into witnesses against their
1 50
clients.
The difference between law and equity is salient for another reason Luban does not discuss. At equity, trial was before the chancellor. 1 51 By contrast, the right to jury trial, with all the adversary
features jury trials imply, traditionally attached to actions at common
law. 15 2 So hostile were early Americans to the judiciary that juries
held the power to decide questions of law, notjust questions of fact.' 53
Judges could instruct, but not in the sense we use the term today145
Petition and Brief of the United Railroad Workers of America, C.I.O., for Leave to
File the Same, Amicus Curiae at 2, Hickman, 329 U.S. 495 (No. 885).
146
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
147

Id. at 511.

148

Id.

149

Id. at 516 (Jackson, J, concurring).

150

Id.

151
See DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIFS § 2.6(1), at 149 (2d ed. 1993) ("Equity courts
did not grant jury trials; law courts did.").
152
See id.
153

See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 399 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
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instructions were guidance to the jury, no more. 54 Upon noticing
error, the judge could grant a new trial, but a new trial was just that, a
chance for another jury to hear the case. Supplementary relief (upon
a showing that one's remedy at law was inadequate) could of course
be sought by resort to the chancery. 55 But given the uniquely important role of the lawyer in pleading, particularly special pleading, and
in trial before juries, we should look for the roots of adversary advocacy in the history of common-law adjudication, not equity practice.
That history suggests a core of deeply embedded practices and social
156
understandings.
Luban also gives an incomplete account of the right to counsel
and its place in the history and doctrine of constitutional due process.
He notes that criminal defense lawyers "were not permitted to address
the courts" in England until 1836 and were not "guaranteed" to defendants in the United States until the 1963 case of Gideon v. Wainwright.157 Civil litigants, he adds, "have no guarantee of counsel" even
in such serious matters as the termination of parental rights. 158
"Guarantee" is a somewhat opaque term here. At least in the United
States, there is no question that parties in both criminal and civil cases
have a constitutional right to counsel under the Due Process Clause
and the First Amendment (and in criminal cases, under the Sixth
Amendment) .159 The cases to which Luban refers involve not the basic right to counsel, but whether the state is constitutionally obliged to
subsidize counsel for litigants who cannot afford it.160 That question
involves not so much the government's endorsement of the adversary
154
See id. at 402 ("Where there is no evidence tending to prove a particular fact, the
court[s] are bound so to instruct the jury, when requested; but they cannot legally give any
instruction which shall take from the jury the right of weighing the evidence and determining what effect it shall have.") (quoting Greenleaf v. Birth, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 292, 299
(1835)).
155
See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. The jury-trial/bench-trial distinction holds today in federal court notwithstanding the merger of law and equity because the
Seventh Amendment "preserve[s]" the right to jury trial "[i]n suits at common law." See
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 n.16 (1959) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. VII).
156
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 140, at 144-52, 391-411; JEAN V. MATTHEWS, RUFUS
CHOATE: THE LAW AND CIVIc VIRTUE 153-60 (1980); NELSON, supra note 140, at 69-78;
Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogatingthe Ideology of Antebellum
Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1450-54 (2003).
157
See LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 54 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
158
See id. at 54-55 (citing Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981)).
159
See U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, VI, XIV.
160
Cf Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27 ("[T]he Court's precedents speak with one voice
about what 'fundamental fairness' has meant when the Court has considered the right to
appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the presumption that an indigent litigant
has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical
liberty.").
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system as the distribution of legal services within a regime that already
takes the right to counsel as relatively uncontroversial.
It is also worth noting that in Lassiterv. Department of Social Services,
the case that Luban properly cites as setting the outer limit of the
constitutionally subsidized right to counsel in areas of state action in
which confinement is not at issue, the Court went out of its way to
note that thirty-three states had already adopted provisions securing
counsel in actions to terminate parental rights. 161 So the guarantee
was present, just not as a federal constitutional mandate. 16 2 In any
event, the case has been criticized heavily, and quite correctly, for failing to recognize that publicly subsidized counsel is as important to the
legitimacy of certain civil proceedings as it is in cases where freedom
63
from state confinement is at issue.'
There are, to be sure, explicitly non-adversarial settings in which
the Court has expressed misgivings about introducing counsel out of
(quite often misplaced) deference to competing government interests. 16 4 One of the clearest examples is Walters v. NationalAssociation of
RadiationSurvivors,1 65 in which then-Justice Rehnquist wrote for a majority that refused to raise a Civil War era $10 cap on attorneys' fees
for veterans seeking disability benefits. 166 Rehnquist justified the refusal on the ground that the statutory scheme for claiming veterans'
benefits is expressly designed to be non-adversarial. 1 67 He claimed
that the panel hearing the veteran's claim should conduct the process
with "informality and solicitude for the claimant," giving the veteran
the benefit of evidentiary presumptions, applying no statute of limita168
tions, and denying res judicata effect to prior claims.
He added that raising the fee cap and bringing lawyers in would
not only reduce the recovery of successful claimants, but would invite
Id. at 34.
See id.
163
See id. at 46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Faced with a formal accusatory adjudication, with an adversary-the State-that commands great investigative and prosecutorial
resources, with standards that involve ill-defined notions of fault and adequate parenting,
and with the inevitable tendency of a court to apply subjective values or to defer to the
State's 'expertise,' the defendant parent plainly is outstripped if he or she is without the
assistance of 'the guiding hand of counsel.' When the parent is indigent, lacking in education, and easily intimidated by figures of authority, the imbalance may well become insuperable.") (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967)) (citations omitted). See generally
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Story of Lassiter: The Importance of Counsel in an Adversary System,
in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIEs 489, 522-26 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004) (describing the
significance of the Lassiter decision and citing literature critical of the decision).
164
See, e.g., infra note 169 and accompanying text.
165
473 U.S. 305 (1985).
166
See id. at 307.
167
See id. at 309-11.
168
See id.
161

162
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misplaced adversarialism. 169 Quoting Judge Friendly, Rehnquist suggested that "[u] nder our adversary system the role of counsel is not to
make sure the truth is ascertained but to advance his client's cause by
any ethical means. Within the limits of professional propriety, causing
delay and sowing confusion not only are his right but may be his
duty."' 170 If veterans show up with lawyers, the government might feel
obliged to do the same, and "the result may be to turn what may have
been a short conference leading to an amicable result into a protracted controversy."'

7 1

Even here, however, the Court's attempted exclusion of counsel
was both controversial and fleeting. As Justice Stevens wrote in
dissent,
If the Government, in the guise of a paternalistic interest in protecting the citizen from his own improvidence, can deny him access to
independent counsel of his choice, it can change the character of
our free society. Even though a dispute with the sovereign may only
involve property rights, or as in this case a statutory entitlement, the
citizen's right of access to the independent, private bar is itself an
72
aspect of liberty that is of critical importance in our democracy'
Responding three years later to extensive testimony by injured veterans whose claims were denied because they lacked the representation
17 3
of counsel, Congress reversed the Court by removing the fee cap.
More broadly, perennial reforms to adversarial practice, the "constant modifications" I believe Luban has in mind, occur within a constitutional framework of due process that is attentive not just to
enhancing the truth-finding function of adjudication and the vindication of substantive legal rights, but also to the right of the parties to
meaningful participation, the demands of efficiency, and, most significantly for present purposes, the weight of past practice. Due process,
169
See id. at 326 ("Thus, even apart from the frustration of Congress' principal goal of
wanting the veteran to get the entirety of the award, the destruction of the fee limitation
would bid fair to complicate a proceeding which Congress wished to keep as simple as
possible. It is scarcely open to doubt that if claimants were permitted to retain compensated attorneys the day might come when it could be said that an attorney might indeed be
necessary to present a claim properly in a system rendered more adversary and more complex by the very presence of lawyer representation.").
170 Id. at 325 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1267, 1288 (1975)).
171
Id. (quoting Friendly, supra note 170, at 1288).
172 Id. at 370-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Stevens, the right to counsel is
too fundamental to be subject to balancing against other interests. He wrote: "The fundamental error in the Court's analysis is its assumption that the individual's right to employ
counsel of his choice in a contest with his sovereign is a kind of second-class interest that
can be assigned a material value and balanced on a utilitarian scale of costs and benefits."
Id. at 368-69.
173 See Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 4063, 102 Stat.
4105, 4116 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 7263 (2000)). On the congressional testimony, see S. REP. No. 100-418 (1988).
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in the eyes of the Court, is itself a historical principle, a commitment
to and reflection of the inherent legitimacy of longstanding practice. 174 This can be seen most powerfully in cases dealing with the
right to notice, 175 personal jurisdiction, 7 6 and the right to counsel for
enemy combatants. 17 7 As Justice Scalia has insisted, where due process is concerned, "its validation is its pedigree.'

1 78

It is nonetheless true that jury trials are an exceptional event in
modern practice. Managerial judging and settlement before trial are
now the norm. For reasons too legion to belabor here, these are facts
to lament to the extent that they reflect the gradual arrogation of
power by judges at the expense of the democratic function of juries. 179 Certain aspects of the overall trend strike me as raising
profound constitutional questions.' 8 0 In any event, the trend has
neither diminished the influence of zealous advocacy nor the importance of access to counsel. Parties hotly contest discovery and pre-trial
practice at least in part because everyone knows that reaching a jury
depends on the success of fact-gathering and procedural maneuvers.
If one fails at this stage, the case will not go to trial, and if one succeeds, particularly by discovering dispositive evidence, a jury typically
will be unnecessary because the other side will settle or lose at summary judgment. 181
174 See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) ("Applying the Due
Process Clause is... an uncertain enterprise which must discover what 'fundamental fairness' consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and
then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.").
175 See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)
(requiring notice in proceedings to settle a trust).
176
See, e.g.,
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (emphasizing that
"traditionalnotions of fair play and substantial justice" guide the due process inquiry).
177
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (requiring hearings for detained
enemy combatants).
178
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 621; see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(making a historical argument against constitutional balancing).
179
The trend dates at least as far back as the conservative movement of Whigs in the
1830s and 40s. Whig lawyers launched a public relations campaign to forestall Jacksonian
democratic populism by, among other things, positioning elite lawyers, and especially
judges, as a heroic high priesthood-as guardians of the republic. See THE LEGAL MIND IN
AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 176-90 (Perry Miller ed. 1969); Norman
W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and ProfessionalismDuringthe Civil
War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 2029-39 (2005).
180 See, e.g.,
Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional,93 VA. L. REV.
139 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme Court has never decided the constitutionality of
summary judgment and that summary judgment violates traditional English common law
notions embodied in the Seventh Amendment).
181 The trial lawyer I mentioned above, see supra p. 1395, has become well enough
known for his trial skills that when a case comes close to trial he is sometimes retained
exclusively for a settlement conference. Once the other side realizes they will face him at
trial, rather than a mere "litigator" who has never tried a case to verdict, they often settle.
This is but one example of the derivative effect to which I earlier referred of the jury-trial
right on cases never tried. See supra note 116.
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Perhaps most importantly, even if Luban is right that "[flew of
our institutions are trusted less than adversary adjudication" 18 2 -a
proposition I think is open to doubt 18 3-it remains as true today as
when Alexis de Tocqueville first said it that adversary system values
permeate our culture and are so deeply embedded as to constitute a
dominant conceptual and discursive frame. This is Tocqueville's
summation:
The influence of legal habits extends beyond the precise limits [of
the legal profession and courts]. Scarcely any political question
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into
ajudicial question. Hence all parties are obliged to borrow, in their
daily controversies, the ideas, and even the language, peculiar to
judicial proceedings. As most public men are, or have been, legal
practitioners, they introduce the customs and technicalities of their
profession into the management of public affairs. The jury extends
this habit to all classes. The language of the law thus becomes, in
some measure, a vulgar tongue ....184
Trials were a principal form of popular entertainment in the nineteenth century. 18 5 They remain so today. We have not only obsessive
news coverage of major trials and legal scandals, court TV, and fictional lawyer shows; we have everything from The People's Court to
186
Animal Court.
There may be a layer of public mistrust; undoubtedly there are
layers of frustration and (justified) resentment as well. But there are
also deep layers of reliance and desire bound up in the social imagination of adversary advocacy. The relationship is of course vexed, but in
just the way most of our sentiments about our fundamental institutional commitments are. None of this is to say that the adversary system or the role lawyers play in it should be immune from reform, any
more than our other fundamental institutional commitments are or
should be. It is just to say that even a pragmatic justification of the
adversary system (under conditions of pluralism, and given its long
history and cultural function) carries enough weight to enjoy a relaLUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 53.
Which institutions are more trusted? The press? The ballot box? The police? The
pulpit? Public education? Health care? The financial markets?
182
183

184

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,

1

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

357-58 (Henry Reeve trans.,

University Press 3d ed. 1863) (1850)
185

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 140, at 309, 575-76.

186

On the interpenetration of adversary system values and cultural discourse, see

ANTHONY

G.

AMSTERDAM

&

JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW

217-45 (2000);

PATRICIA

& SUSAN S. SIBLEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW (1998); RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN
LAw GOES PoP (2000); LUBAN, Nightmare and Dream, supra note 88, at 146 n.42 ("[T]he
Supreme Court's Mirandadecision has plainly entered popular consciousness, and virtually
anyone who watches television knows that police have to read suspects their rights when
they arrest them.").
EWICK
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tively strong presumption of validity. If the adversary system enjoys
this substantial (not weak, not bulletproof) justification, lawyers' professional role acts do too.
CONCLUSION: THE TORTURE LAwYERS

I believe this modest, historically grounded defense of the adversary system avoids the weaknesses of the romantic, plainly ideological,
" [d]istant angels sing[ing]"18 7 version that the profession has so often
offered and that Luban rightly rejects. Moreover, the core attributes
of the defense suggested here-information asymmetry, value pluralism, the distinction between self-centered lawyering and genuinely client-centered lawyering, and the validation of tradition-offer
important insights into Luban's provocative chapter about the torture
memos and the lawyers who wrote them.18 8 The chapter is well argued and clearly demonstrates both the professional error of the lawyers who offered opinions attempting to justify torture of the Bush
Administration's detainees-the "torture lawyers," as Luban calls
them-and the profound moral and social costs of their error. The
work of these lawyers and the executive-branch actions they attempted
to justify has diminished our standing in the world and has made us
less safe.
What I would add to Luban's analysis lies at a point of intersection with his equally provocative chapters re-imagining legal theory as
an inquiry into lawyers' work rather than styles of adjudication.' 89 In
these two chapters he argues compellingly that lawyers are responsible
for the production of law; that our work with clients produces law well
before, and quite often in the absence or distant shadow of any adjudication, regulation, or legislation; and that legal theory is all the
poorer for missing this perspective by focusing, to the point of blind
obsession, on the legal reasoning of appellate judges.
Here is the rub. The production of law is precisely the project in
which the torture lawyers believed they were engaged. Unfortunately,
and notwithstanding all the public obloquy and righteous indignation, they have at least partly succeeded-not just via unilateral executive action, but with the help of Congress. 190 It is too easy to say that
the torture lawyers were overly subservient to their client, that the
187
188
189
190

LUBAN, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 7, at 27.
See LUBAN, Torture Lawyers, supra note 6.
See LUBAN, Natural Law, supra note 6; LUBAN, Nightmare and Dream, supra note 88.
See LUBAN, Torture Layers, supra note 6, at 204 ("[The Military Commissions Act of

2006] (the worst piece of legislation I can recall from my lifetime) was clearly inspired by
the style of legal thinking perfected by the torture lawyers. In effect, the torture lawyers
helped to define a 'new normal,' without which the Military Commissions Act would not
exist."). I no more celebrate their success than Luban does, but the change in law to a new
status quo cannot be ignored.
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problem was their entrenchment in a role that required them to banish conscience and all sense of legal limitations. 19 1 Make no mistake,
these lawyers were complicit in the lawlessness of the executive officers they served. But the evidence-particularly their extensive
backgrounds in conservative legal, political, and academic circlessuggests that they were complicit in the way cause lawyers frequently
are. That is, it appears that they were motivated not by anything like a
professional standard of moral neutrality with respect to client ends,
but rather by deep personal and ideological commitment to the ends
degree
of the Bush Administration (supplemented, no doubt, by some
19 2
of self-interest in the form of ambition for higher office).
Like the executive officers they served, the professional records
of these lawyers reflect sympathy toward, then formal legal endorsement of, the President's agenda (i.e., general hostility to international
law, qua law; believing in the constitutionality of nearly absolute presidential powers in time of war; asserting that our engagement with al
Qaeda is sui generis under the laws of war; and asserting the legitimacy of employing extraordinary measures against detainees who
have been formalistically defined out of the rights of citizens and prisoners of war).19 3 To the extent that existing law conflicted with that
agenda, the torture lawyers seemed all too comfortable with stretching
the law to the breaking point to reshape it in conformity with the normative universe they and the President wish to inhabit. Thus, their
professional errors-their legal misjudgments-strike me as more
likely the product of closely held ideological commitments than the
standard professional obligation of morally humble client service.
Put differently, while it is tempting to view the work of the torture
lawyers as the nadir of zealous advocacy, the final proof that professional standards are morally bankrupt and that lawyers must attend to
191 See LUBAN, Torture Lawyers, supra note 6, at 163-64 & n.5 (taking at face value John
Yoo's claim that he was not "offering morally motivated advice").
192 On the ambition for higher office, see id. at 201 (citing Bybee's appointment to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
193
On their positions and activities before entering the Department ofJustice, see, for
example, John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
1673 (2000); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84. CAL L. REv. 167 (1996); John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr
Trial, United States v. Nixon, and PresidentialPower, 83 MINN. L. Rv. 1435 (1999); John C.
Yoo, UN War Powers, US War Powers, 1 CHI.J. INT'L LAW 355 (2000). Luban concedes that
"even before 9/11," the agenda of the Administration "had preoccupied Yoo, Cheney, and
Addington." See LUBAN, Torture Lawyers, supra note 6, at 172 n.28, 174. On their positions
since entering service at the Department ofJustice, see JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW ANDJUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007) (describing the views
of Vice President Dick Cheney and his counsel from 2001-2005, David Addingtion); THE
TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006); THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE

ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
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the moral consequences of their role acts, 194 I think the more accurate, if discomfiting, view is that their work reveals the cost of endorsing moral activism in the professional role. Disinterested client
1 95
service would have produced more balanced legal assessments.
Those assessments might not have restrained executive officers as determined as those in the Bush Administration, but they would have
made clear the novel, legally tenuous nature of that action. That, and
not moral heroism in the name of human dignity, is what should be
expected of the lawyer in the first instance. Genuinely client-centered
lawyering requires courage enough and delivers enough restraint.
More generally, I believe matters might have been and still stand
to be improved by greater emphasis on adversary system values in this
context, not less. Part of the reason the conduct occurred in the first
instance, and much of the reason it persists, is that it is shrouded in
secrecy. Adversary adjudication in the form of access to counsel,
habeas review, meaningful rights for detainees to participate in adjudication of their status (e.g., notice of charges, access to evidence,
confrontation of witnesses, etc.), and open trials, would make possible
the kind of public review that can confer far more legitimacy on state
action than falsely reassuring tales of dark conspiracies averted. What
makes the Bush Administration's program of enemy combatant detention so troubling is precisely that it reflects the worst kind of inquisitorial excess (right down to confessions extracted by torture) along with
all the fears and temptations that form of secret, unilateral state action
plays upon and invites.
The Administration is deeply embedded in its own strategy of
"graymail" to avoid meaningful review of its actions in this arena, contending that openness of almost any kind jeopardizes national security
and that detainees will invariably subvert due process rights to serve
the ends of terrorism. And so the elephant in the room, the gravity of
any real threat, becomes all the more opaque, and our liberties all the
more ethereal. The answer, it seems to me, is to steadfastly insist
upon due process of law as we know it and as the Constitution secures

194
See LUBAN, Torture Lawyers, supra note 6, at 192-204 (arguing that the legal positions
in the torture memos are frivolous and formalistic advocacy briefs thinly disguised as disinterested advisory opinions and that they constitute a threat to human dignity).
195
In a footnote, Luban concedes that a "lawyer who okays unlawful conduct by the
client has also harmed the client, and therefore been a bad fiduciary of the client." Id. at
201 n.121. But he attempts to cleave this from the role morality debate by insisting that
breach of fiduciary duty (breach of the client-centered ethic) is "both as a matter of law
and morality. .. a distinct ethical violation from becoming the client's accomplice." Id. It
is a distinct violation, but if the breach of fiduciary duty is precisely what leads to complicity
in the client's illicit conduct, the rules that enforce fiduciary duties to the client are the
proper object of focus.
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it. 19 6 After all, to suggest that the law may be used against itself is a

truly empty argument. At least in a society committed to the adversary
system, that is one of its regular and most important functions.

196 1 stridently disagree with those who contend that resort to the courts is optional as
well as those who contend that the courts are not institutionally competent to handle terrorism related cases. See, e.g.,John Farmer, Op-Ed, A Terror Threat in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2008, § 4, at 14 ("A closer look at the Padilla case and other terrorism prosecutions
reveals... that the continued reliance on our criminal justice system as the main domestic
weapon in the struggle against terrorism fails on two counts: it threatens not only to leave
our nation unprotected but also to corrupt the foundations of the criminal law itself.").
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